szn

Bug 375 — Client-side packet length unvalidated against protocol cap

375. Server got this right; client didn’t

File: src/main.zig:872-886 Severity: MEDIUM Status: ✅ FIXED

Fix (applied)

New protocol.validPacketLength() helper (bounds: 5 ≤ len ≤ MAX_PACKET_SIZE) is used by the client’s stream parser; oversized declared lengths now exit cleanly instead of buffering forever. Mirrors the server-side MessageReader bound.

Test: validPacketLength bounds — bug #375 (edge cases at both bounds plus hostile maxInt(u32)).

Problem

const pkt_len = std.mem.readInt(u32, ...);
if (pkt_len < 5) {...}
if (read_buf.items.len - read_pos < pkt_len) break;   // wait forever

No pkt_len <= protocol.MAX_PACKET_SIZE check (the server’s MessageReader has one). A single flipped bit or hostile injection pins the client buffering forever via ensureUnusedCapacity(4096) per POLLIN.

Fix (proposed)

Reject pkt_len > MAX_PACKET_SIZE exactly like client.recvPacket does (error.PacketTooLarge → disconnect). Test: feed a header declaring an absurd length and expect clean failure.